Networking on white spaces (i.e., locally unused spectrum) relies on active monitoring of spectrum usage. Spectrum databases based on empirical radio propagation models are widely adopted but shown to be error-prone, since they do not account for built environments like trees and man-made buildings. As an economically viable option, crowd-sensed radio mapping acquires more accurate local spectrum data from mobile users and constructs radio maps using spatial models such as Kriging and Gaussian Process. Success of such crowd-sensing systems presumes some incentive mechanisms to attract user participation. In this work, we consider the scenario where the platform who constructs radio environment maps makes one-time offers to selected users, and collects data from those who accept the offers. We design pricing mechanisms based on expected utility (EU) maximization, where EU captures the tradeoff between radio mapping performance (location and data quality), crowd-sensing cost and uncertainty in offer outcomes (i.e., possible expiration and rejection). Specifically, we consider sequential offering, where one best price offer is sent to the best user in each round, and batched offering, where a batch of multiple offers are made in each round. For the later, we show that EU is submodular in the discrete domain, and propose a mechanism that first fixes the pricing rule and selects users based on Unconstrained Submodular Maximization (USM); it then compares different pricing rules to find the best batch of offers in each round. We show that USM-based user selection has provable performance guarantee. Proposed mechanisms are evaluated and compared against utility-maximization-based baseline mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
The exponentially increasing mobile data traffic has translated into a greater demand for wireless network capacity and more spectrum for broadband use. A significant portion of spectrum is allocated for various services (e.g., TV broadcasting, radar and satellite services), but often underutilized in practice. To improve spectrum utilization, the FCC allows unlicensed users to opportunistically access locally idle licensed spectrum, aka White Spaces (WS), subject to the noharmful-interference constraint [2] .
A key step of WS networking is to actively monitor spectrum usage and identify WS opportunities. Currently, empirical radio propagation models are widely used and implmented in spectrum databases [3] - [6] for this purpose, but recent studies Manuscript [7]- [9] have shown that they are often locally inaccurate since they do not account for built environments like trees and man-made buildings. To augment spectrum databases, radio mapping based on spatial statistics (e.g., Kriging [9] - [11] and Gaussian Processes (GP) [12] , [13] ) has been proposed, which leverages local RSSI 1 data and provides accurate local RSSI estimation at unmeasured locations.
To collect data for spatial statistics, measurement campaigns like drive tests are usually required, but they may be time-and labor-intensive for continuously monitoring a wide area. Deploying sensors is a second option, but large-scale deployment can be costly due to expensive hardware. An economically viable alternative is crowd-sensing, that is, outsourcing sensing tasks to mobile users who have devices that are equipped with spectrum sensors. However, since users consume resources (e.g., battery, CPU and memory) for sensing, they need to be properly compensated or incentivized.
Crowd-sensed radio mapping is different from other crowdsensing applications [14] - [16] in several ways. First, it aims to sample the (unknown) RSSI field only at reported user locations at a time instant (or within a short duration) and applies spatial statistics to estimate RSSI values at unmeasured locations. For radio mapping, it is not necessary to specify targeted sensing locations, and the relative positioning of selected user locations matters. Second, user devices are heterogeneous and provide data of different quality (i.e., hardware noise). It needs to be taken into account by the spatial model. Third, user devices are not dedicated to sensing and busy with many other tasks simultaneously. Hence, in additional to energy or battery costs, users will incur opportunity costs depending on current device statuses, which is the loss of potential gain when they decide to spend resources on sensing instead of other tasks.
In this work, we consider pricing [17] - [19] in an offline setting for crowd-sensed radio mapping. Given a spatial model (or RSSI data model), the platform (i.e., the party who acquires RSSI data) determines the value of a set of users based on location, data quality and it own preferences, which is the amount (of money) the platform is willing to pay. Each user has a private sensing cost (i.e., sum of energy and opportunity costs). Selected users receive one-time price offers and have only one chance to make a decision, either accept or reject. Here, we consider rational users who accept offers if its sensing cost is no greater than the offered price. Those who accept offers perform sensing at reported locations, upload data and receive payments. Therefore, from the platform's perspective, a set of users is associated with a utility or gain, which is the difference between value and total payment. Due to possible offer expiration (due to network congestion etc.) and rejection, the platform aims to maximize the expected utility (EU) by determining who to send offers to (i.e., user selection) and how much to offer (i.e., price determination).
Our primary contributions are as follows: • We design a crowd-sensing system that periodically acquires spectrum data from users for radio mapping. • We introduce EU and formulate pricing mechanism design as EU maximization. We first propose sequential offering, where the platform sends out the best offer to the best user in each round, and keeps offering until the next one is no longer profitable. Then we generalize it to batched (i.e., single-batch and multi-batch) offering, where a batch of multiple offers are made in each round. • For batched offering, we show that EU is submodular in the discrete domain. We propose a pricing mechanism that first fixes the pricing rule, and selects users based on Unconstrained Submodular Maximization (USM); it compares different pricing rules to find the best batch of offers in each round. We show that our USM-based user selection that takes the estimated EU (via the Monte-Carlo method), instead of the true EU (which is difficult to evaluate) as input, obtains a solution whose true EU value is no less than one third of the true EU value of the optimal solution minus a term due to estimation errors (which grows linearly in the number of users given the maximum estimation error). • We conduct simulations to evaluate the proposed mechanisms and compare them against baseline mechanisms based on (best-case) utility maximization. Our results show that with a single batch, the proposed mechanism is better than the baseline mechanism with an improvement ranging from 8.5% to 40.5%. If more batches are permitted (and unlimited), the proposed mechanism has close performance with the baseline mechanism, but requires much fewer batches (2.5 vs. 7.7 batches on average) and thus a much smaller delay. Sequential offering is easy to implement and works better than the single-batch baseline mechanism, but has a very large cumulative delay. Offer expiration adversely affected all mechanisms, but sequential and batched offering are more robust. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review related work in Section II and provide a two-user tutorial example in Section III. In Section IV, we provide background on submodularity and present our models. Our pricing mechanisms are presented in Section V and evaluated in Section VI. We conclude this study in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
In recent years, spatial-statistics-based radio mapping has been proposed to better capture local radio environments to augment spectrum databases. In [20] , Phillips et al. applied a statistical interpolation technique called Ordinary Kriging to map the coverage of WiMax networks. Similar techniques have been applied to estimate the coverage area of single-transmitter [9] and multi-transmitter networks [11] in TV bands. A more detailed discussion is available in [21] .
Radio mapping requires a large amount of sensing data, and incentivized crowd-sensing is considered as an economically viable option. A number of various incentive mechanisms have been proposed based on different models, such as Stackelberg game [14] , reverse auction [14] , [22] , [23] , all-pay auction [24] , Bayesian models [15] , Tullock contests [25] and posted pricing [17] , [19] , [26] . Some are proposed in an online setting with constraints like budget limits [26] - [28] , where users arrive in a random order and the goal is to maximize a certain objective (e.g., revenue).
Incentive mechanisms are typically designed to account for requirements of the crowd-sensing application being considered, such as user locations, data quality and user availability. For example, in [22] , each task has a specific location tag and each user can only compete for tasks within its service region. In [16] , Peng et al. extended the well-known Expectation Maximization algorithm to estimate the quality of sensing data and incorporated it in determining rewards. In [19] , Han et al. studied a quality-aware Bayesian pricing problem where both users' sensing costs and qualities are random variables, drawn from known distributions. The goal is to choose an appropriate posted price to recruit a group of users with reasonable sensing quality, and minimize the total expected payment. If users need to move to designated sensing locations or are available at different time periods, then incentive mechanism design is closely coupled with task allocation [18] or scheduling [29] .
In this study, we consider incentive mechanism design in an offline setting specifically for crowd-sensed radio mapping. In our system, the platform acquires data periodically from users who are readily available for sensing, and measurements are taken at their current locations. Besides, we consider data quality in terms of hardware noise, and incorporate it into the spatial model (i.e., GP). Different from the auction-based incentive mechanism for crowd-sensed radio mapping [23] , we are interested in pricing mechanisms, where the platform makes one-time price offers to a set of selected users, and collects data from those who accept offers. To select users and determine corresponding price offers, we define utility for the platform to trade the value (which reflects radio mapping performance) against the total price (crowd-sensing cost), and further extend it to EU to account for possible offer expiration and rejection. We formulate the pricing mechanism design as EU maximization, and propose mechanisms based on USM.
III. A TWO-USER TUTORIAL EXAMPLE
Before presenting our general model, we first present our system architecture and provide a two-user example to illustrate the basic idea of pricing for crowd-sensed radio mapping.
A. System Architecture
As shown in Fig. 1 , the platform acquires data periodically from users. At the beginning of each period, the platform broadcasts a sensing task to all users in the area of interest (AoI) with specific sensing parameters (e.g., center frequency, sampling rate and FFT bin size) to ensure a consistent sensing procedure across different hardware. Note that the task does not specify sensing locations with twofold reasons. First, Fig. 1 : Pricing-based crowd-sensing system with pricing mechanisms. (1) In each period, the platform first broadcasts a sensing task to users in the area of interest. (2) Users who are interested and available for sensing in the current period report location and device type. (3) The platform determines and sends out one-time offers to selected users. (4) If a selected user decides to accept the offer, it performs the required sensing task. All selected users will inform the platform of their decisions (and upload the data) before the deadline. (5) The platform pays users who contribute data.
there is no need to do so, since the platform will take a posteriori sampling approach to select users. It is the relative positioning of measurements instead of exact sensing locations that matters for radio mapping. Second, it requires extra time and costs for users to move to target sensing locations, which means extra incentivization costs for the platform and added complexity for mechanism design 2 .
To avoid excessive delay due to communication delay or failure, network congestion etc., each offer has a deadline, by which a decision has to be received by the platform (along with the data if accepted); otherwise, the offer will be expired.
In this study, we assume no entry or other overhead costs, that is, a user does not incur a fee to communicate with the platform. We consider users of low mobility (e.g., pedestrians), who are honest in providing their information and following the protocol. We assume small displacements between reported locations and eventual sensing locations. We will leave the high-mobility case and security considerations as future work.
B. A Two-User Scenario
In this example, the platform wants to estimate the RSSI Z(x 0 ) at location x 0 . There are two users S = {1, 2} at x 1 and x 2 in the AoI. In each period, each user will incur a sensing cost c i > 0 and receive an offer p i > 0, when selected by the platform. We assume that users are rational and will accept the offer if c i ≤ p i , and reject it otherwise. In the following discussion, we assume no expired offers and will consider them later in Section V.
The platform has a valuation function v : 2 S → R + and a pricing function p : 2 S → R + . For each set of users A, there is an associated value v(A) and a total price of all offers p(A) = i∈A p i (i.e., crowd-sensing cost for the platform), assuming that each offer is unexpired and accepted. It makes sense for the platform, as a rational decision maker and company, to maximize its utility (or profit), i.e., which is an important and widely used concept in economics (e.g., rational choice theory [30] ) and measures the platform's preference over the set of users A. For convenience, we also write v(A), p(A) and u(A) as v A , p A and u A , respectively. In practice, however, the probability that an offer is accepted (and data is uploaded to the platform) by the deadline is less than 1, due to possible expiration and rejection. Hence, only a subset of users in A accept offers, and u(A) is essentially the best-case utility. In this case, it makes more senses for the platform to maximize the average-case or expected utility (EU). More will be discussed later in this example.
C. How to Valuate Users
For illustration, we consider two RSSI data models: one ignoring shadowing and noise, and the other one accounting for both. Both models assume small variations in path-lossimpaired RSSIs in the AoI, and small-scale fading over small distances and time has been averaged out during sensing.
1) Model I -Shadowing-Free, Noise-Free: This model assumes a constant but unknown RSSI at any location within the AoI. When there are no measurements, both users are equally valuable, since either can provide accurate estimation. Once one is recruited, a second user has zero marginal value.
We set v 0 = 10 for later calculations.
2) Model II -Shadowing-Aware, Noise-Aware: This model models the measured RSSI by user i as a random variable,
where µ is the path-loss-impaired RSSI (unknown but constant), δ(x i ) ∼ N (0, σ 2 xi ) is shadowing and i ∼ N (0, σ 2 i ) is hardware noise. Since shadowing is a spatial phenomenon, {δ(x i )} are correlated with each other and RSSIs at two closer locations are more correlated (i.e., a larger covariance), while { i } are independent of each other and of shadowing.
Suppose that Ordinary Kriging [10] is used for RSSI estimation. With either user, we haveẐ( 3 and ω 1 +ω 2 = 1. The popular metric called (minimized) mean squared error (MSE) E[(Ẑ(x 0 )−Z(x 0 ))] 2 ) is used to quantify the performance, and a smaller MSE implies a better estimator.
To translate MSE to value that is comparable to payments, the platform adopts the following valuation function,
where α 1 , α 2 are constants and α 2 − M SE(A) ≥ 0 for any A ⊆ S. Since MSE is undefined for A = ∅, we set v(∅) = 0. Intuitively, v(·) captures the diminishing returns behaviors: adding a new element increases v more, if there are fewer elements so far, and less, if there are more elements. This is further formalized by the notion of submodularity, which will be elaborated in Section IV-A. We consider two cases under this model: • Case 1: User 1 is closer to x 0 and both have the same device type. Suppose σ 0,1 = 0.5 > σ 0,2 = 0.4, and σ 2 1 = σ 2 2 = 0.2, where σ i,j is the covariance between δ(x i ) and δ(x j ). • Case 2: User 1 is closer to x 0 but has a device that provides data of lower quality. Suppose σ 0,1 = 0.5 > σ 0,2 = 0.4 and σ 2 As an example, we set α 1 = 10 and α 2 = 3. The value of each subset in both cases can be computed using Eq. (3) and is summarized in Table I .
The above highlights a few things. First, apart from the platform's preferences (e.g., choice of valuation function and parameters like v 0 , α 1 and α 2 ), the RSSI data model plays an important role. Second, for a reasonable RSSI data model that considers both shadowing and noise, user locations are important (e.g., Case 1 of Model II); data quality also matters and affects valuation (e.g., Case 2 of Model II).
D. How to Select and Pay Users
At this point, v(·) is available to the platform (Table I) . The next step is to select a subset of users and determine their price offers. This process is called "incentivizing".
1) Deterministic Cost: If user devices are treated as specialized spectrum sensors, then sensing costs are dominated by energy (or battery) costs [31] . In this case, it is reasonable to assume deterministic sensing costs, which can be inferred from the task and device type. Since the platform knows {c i }, it can set p {i} = c i to minimize payments while guaranteeing offer acceptance, and search for the best set of users.
Suppose c 1 = 6 and c 2 = 5. Then p {1} = 6, p {2} = 5 and p {1,2} = p {1} + p {2} = 11. The platform can afford both users under Model II, but only one under Model I. It is easy to see that A * = {2} leads to the maximum utility for both models.
2) Random Cost with Known Distributions: In crowdsensing, however, a user incurs an additional opportunity cost, i.e., the loss of potential gain when the user decides to spend resources on sensing instead of other tasks. It depends on the task and device status that varies over time. Hence, the perceived sensing cost in each period consists of a deterministic energy cost and a random opportunity cost.
In this case, it makes sense to model user i's sensing cost as a continuous random variable C i in [c i ,c i ], wherē c i ≥ c i > 0 and c i represents the minimum energy cost. Random variables {C i } are independent of each other. Since device status is considered sensitive information, C i is private and only user i knows its realization in each period, c i , by evaluating the task and current device status 4 . We assume that the platform has only a priori probabilistic knowledge of C i . Let f Ci (c i ) and F Ci (c i ) be the probability density function (PDF) and corresponding cumulative density function (CDF), respectively. The PDF and c i ,c i could be learned by the platform from the empirical distribution out of prior cost declarations by users of the same device type, or from its long-term interaction with users (e.g., whether or not accept an offer with a known price). If such prior information is absent, C i may be assumed to be uniformly distributed over
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the platform can infer f Ci (c i ) or F Ci (c i ) based on the reported device type.
Since the platform does not know {c i }, it needs to consider possible offer rejections. For A = {1} or {2}, the uncertainty in user decisions implies the following utility,
which is a Bernoulli random variable and the acceptance probability is Pr
. In this case, it makes more sense to consider the EU,
and the platform wants to find p * {i} that maximizes EU {i} , i.e., EU maximization. For A = {1, 2}, the EU is given by
and the goal is to find p * = [p * {1} , p * {2} ] that maximizes EU {1,2} . Note that the platform does not have to send out offers all at once and stop (i.e., single-batch offering); it can send more batches of backup offers (i.e., multi-batch offering) based on the knowledge of outcomes of previous offers. For illustration, we set C 1 ∼ U [4, 7] and C 2 ∼ U [5, 6] , where U [·, ·] represents the uniform distribution.
For pricing, the platform's first thought could be setting p {i} =c i , and the rest is the same with the deterministic-cost case. A natural generalization is to choose a desired probability of acceptance 5 
is the inverse CDF. Given γ, prices are fixed and the platform wants to maximize the EU. Taking Case 2 of Model II and γ = 0.95 as an example, we have p {1} = 6.85, p {2} = 5.95, p {1,2} = 12.8, and A * = {2} is the best with EU {2} = 3.78 by Eq. (5) and (6) . Note that the platform may further consider user 1, if user 2 rejects the offer. Then the overall EU with multi-batch offering would be
Given A, γ can also be optimized in each batch. Taking Case 2 of Model II as an example, when A = {1}, EU {1} = (9.56− (4 + 3γ))γ and γ * = 0.93, EU * {1} = 2.58. Similarly, for A = {2}, EU {2} = (9.93 − (5 + γ))γ and γ * = 1, EU * {2} = 3.93. When A = {1, 2}, we have EU {1,2} = −8.09γ 2 + 10.49γ and γ * = 0.65, EU * {1,2} = 3.40. In this case, instead of using the same γ, the platform can also choose {γ i } for each user separately, and maximizing Eq. (6) leads to γ * 1 = 0, γ * 2 = 1. As we can see, the notation of utility accounts for locations, data quality and sensing costs, and the notation of EU further considers possible offer rejections. We can also see that user selection and price determination are closely coupled in a pricing mechanism. More will be discussed in Section V.
IV. PRELIMINARIES AND OUR MODEL
In this section, we first provide brief background on submodularity. Then we present our RSSI data model and define the metric for measuring radio mapping performance. Finally, we present our valuation model and explore its properties.
A. Preliminaries
The submodularity property is formally defined as follows.
Equivalently [32] , a function f is submodular if, for any A ⊆ B ⊆ Ω and any i ∈ Ω \ B,
The notion of submodularity captures diminishing returns behaviors: adding a new element increases f more, if there are fewer elements so far, and less, if there are more elements. One of the most basic submodular maximization problems is USM, which is formally defined as follows. It is well known that USM is NP-hard [32] , [33] and thus heuristic-based algorithms are often used to find approximate solutions. One state-of-art linear-time deterministic algorithm is proposed in [34] and provided in Algorithm 1 for reference in the rest of this work. It is essentially a greedy algorithm, and achieves a 1/3-approximation, i.e., the algorithm obtains a solution A with the guarantee that f (A)
Algorithm 1: USM input : S -ground set, f -nonnegative submodular function output: A n (or B n ) -selected subset
B. RSSI Data Model -Gaussian Process (GP)
In this study, we employ GP [12] , [13] (a generalization of Kriging) for radio mapping. Let the set of n interested users be S, and the finely discretized AoI be U , where |U | |S| = n, where | · | is the cardinality operator. Define V = S ∪ U and each index i ∈ V corresponds to a location x i . Since the platform obtains noisy RSSI measurements from users S and wants to estimate noiseless front-end RSSIs at unmeasured locations U , the RSSI Z(x i ) or Z i is modeled as a Gaussian random variable in GP, which is given by
is spatially correlated shadowing and i ∼ N (0, σ 2 i ) is hardware noise of user i's device.
Define a kernel (or covariance) function K(·, ·) such that K(i, j) is the covariance between δ(x i ) and δ(x j ). In GP, the RSSIs at locations V constitute a Gaussian random vector
where
i∈V is the mean vector and Σ V V is the covariance matrix. For any pair of indices i, j ∈ V , their covariance σ ij is the (i, j)-th entry of Σ V V , which is given by
Given a set of measurements Z A where A ⊆ S, Z(x i ) is a conditional Gaussian random variable with a mean µ Z(xi)|Z A (or simply µ i|A ) and a variance of σ 2 Z(xi)|Z A (or simply σ 2 i|A ),
Note that the posterior variance in Eq. (13) only depends on Σ V V , not the actual measured values z A . Estimating K(·, ·) can be difficult in practice, and it is often assumed that K(·, ·) is stationary (i.e., a function of location displacement) and isotropic (i.e., a function of distance). In other words, K(i, j) = K θ (||x i − x j ||), where θ is a set of parameters. That being said, our following discussions do not assume stationarity or isotropy, and thus can be applied to general kernel functions. But we do assume both mean and kernel functions have been estimated from previous measurements 6 and available in the current period.
C. Mutual Informaiton (MI) for Uncertainty Reduction
To measure radio mapping performance, we adopt the MI metric [13] , which is defined as follows, (14) which is the amount of uncertainty reduction about RSSIs at unmeasured locations given measurements at A.
Note that the platform is interested in Z V \A , which includes RSSIs at S \ A (i.e., locations with confirmed user presence) and U (i.e., locations with possible user presence). As implicitly assumed in [13] , Z(x i ) includes noise for i ∈ S \ A in the definition of MI, which is not a big issue, since noise is relatively small. Compared to the entropy criterion H(Z V \A |Z A ), MI tends to not select users along the boundaries and avoids the "waste" of information.
Denote by M I(i|A) the marginal MI of an additional user i ∈ S \ A given A. It is given by
where H(Z i |Z A ) = 1 2 log(2πeσ 2 i|A ) is the conditional entropy, and it can be easily computed from Eq. (13) .
It has been shown in [13] that M I(A) is both submodular and α-approximately monotone 7 . For any α > 0, a discretization level exists so that M I(A) is approximately monotone.
D. Valuation Function
We consider the following valuation function v : 2 S → R + for the platform, v(A) = κ · log(1 + M I (A)),
where κ > 0 is a constant and M I (A) = M I(A)+α|A|. Intuitively, κ is the currency that reflects the platform's preference over per unit MI (in log scale). Commonly used in economics, log(·) further emphasizes the diminishing returns behavior. We 6 In [20] , authors used a predictive (empirical) path loss model to estimate the mean process µ(x). This procedure is called detrending. In the same paper as well as [9] , authors estimated an empirical semivarigram γ(·) (isotropic and stationary) from real measurements and fitted it with parametric models. The relationship between γ(·) and K(·, ·) is K(i, j) = c 0 − γ(||x i − x j ||) for i = j, where c 0 is some constant. 7 Intuitively, M I(A) is monotone under the condition that |V | |S| ≥ |A| and thus adding one more user increases the MI. Otherwise, consider the example in which S = {1, 2} and |V | = |S|, then M I(∅) = M I({1, 2}) = 0 but M I({1}) > 0 and M I({2}) > 0, which means that MI first increases then decreases as more users are selected. Its monotonicity is approximate due to the extreme case where there exist two (or more) users arbitrarily close to each other. If one is selected, selecting the other one will decrease MI. In practice, the platform can avoid such extreme cases by considering only one of them. Also, a pricing mechanism that maximizes the (expected) utility should not select both, because the second user is not beneficial for radio mapping and not free-of-charge.
introduce α|A| to ignore the extreme case where some users are arbitrarily close to each other, which rarely occurs and/or can be avoided in practice (see Footnote 7) .
We show that there exists useful structural properties like submodularity and monotonicity in v(A). Lemma 1. The valuation function v(·) in Eq. (17) is monotone submodular.
Proof. See Appendix A-A for proof.
V. PRICING MECHANISM
In this section, we formulate pricing mechanism design as expected utility (EU) maximization and propose two schemes: (1) sequential offering and (2) batched offering.
A. EU Maximization
Given S, v(·) and {F Ci (c i )}, the platform wants to determine a set of offers (A, p), where A ⊆ S are selected users and p = [p i ] i∈A is the corresponding prices. Let the decision of the i-the selected user be X i , which is given by
, offer is accepted) 0, else (i.e., offer is rejected) .
It is a Bernoulli random variable (from the platform's perspective), and Pr(
As mentioned in Section III-A, an offer may be expired, and this event can be captured by a random variable X i , i.e.,
where ρ i = Pr(X i = 1) is the probability of an unexpired offer. We assume that the platform can estimate ρ i and that X i is independent of X i . Let Y i be a random variable that represents whether a user is successfully recruited (i.e., offer is unexpired and accepted),
is the probability that the i-th selected user is recruited. Define Y = [Y i ] i∈A and let y be the realization of Y. Then A y ⊆ A is the set of recruited users whose offers are unexpired and accepted. Then the EU is given by (22) where Pr(A y , p) =
are the probability and utility of A y given p, respectively. The goal of the platform is to design a pricing mechanism based on EU maximization, that is, max A⊆S,p EU (A, p). (25) In this sense, a pricing mechanism consists of a selection rule and a pricing rule, which is joint optimization in the discrete domain of A and the continuous domain of p.
B. Sequential Offering
We first consider a special case of EU maximization, where |A| = 1. That is, the platform only selects one best user with its best offer in each round, and waits for its decision before making the next offer. We call it sequential offering. Formally, the task in each round is
where y represents the outcomes of offers that have been sent so far and is known to the platform.
while EU i * > τ do 8 Send the offer (i * , p * i * ) and observe y i * ;
if y i * = 1 then break; 11 else i * ← arg max i∈S\A EU i ; 12 return A, p, y;
The algorithm for sequential offering is described in Algorithm 2. The idea is to determine the best price for each remaining user that maximizes the EU, and then selects the best user with the maximum EU obtained at its best price.
1) Price Determination (Lines 3-5): Depending on whether user i ∈ S \ A is successfully recruited, the utility is
is the marginal value of i given A y . The task is to find
Note that ρ i in Pr(Y i = 1) in Eq. (21) is omitted since it is a constant and does not affect p * i . If f Ci (c i ) = F Ci (c i ) is differentiable and non-increasing, the objective function in Eq. (28) will be concave in p i , and p * i can be obtained with efficient algorithms (e.g., gradient descent). If F Ci (c i ) is twice continously differentiable, techniques such as interval analysis may be used to find p * [35] . More sophisticated algorithms for non-convex (non-concave) optimization are available in [36] .
2) User Selection (Line 6): The best user i * that maximizes the EU is found,
Note that the above selection also takes ρ i into account. If the user is recruited (Lines 10), the algorithm will go to Line 3 to recompute best prices for remaining users; otherwise, it sends out the next best offer immediately until one is accepted (Lines 7-11). To enable fast convergence, the platform can set a minimum threshold τ > 0 (e.g., 0.01) for the marginal EU (Line 7). The platform stops making offers when there are (1) no remaining users or (2) none of the remaining users leads to a non-trivial marginal EU.
3) Complexity Analysis: If we assume O(1) for computing the best price for a single user, the overall computational complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(n 2 ), since it takes O(n) to compute best prices for all remaining users and may select up to n users in the worst case. The inner while-loop does not require re-computation of best prices and is dominated by the for-loop. Note that O(n 2 ) is very conservative, since the algorithm may stop much earlier based on the configuration.
C. Batched Offering
As we can see, sequential offering is intuitive and straightforward, but its main drawback is the (possibly) large delay accumulated over multiple rounds of offering. Hence, a natural generalization is to make multiple offers (i.e., a batch) in each round and continue offering for multiple rounds. We call it batched (i.e., single-batch or multi-batch) offering.
In batched offering, the platform is faced with the general case of EU maximization in Eq. (25) in each round. Unfortunately, joint optimization can be difficult in practice, mainly because EU (A, p) is a multi-variate function in the continuous domain of p given A, and there may not exist structural properties like concavity in general to enable efficient computation of the global optimum. Exhaustive search is prohibitive as the space of p is huge. Fortunately, EU (A, p) has a useful structural property (i.e., submodularity) in the discrete domain of A as a set function, which inspires our following pricing mechanism design. Lemma 2. For a given p, EU (A, p) is submodular in A.
Proof. See Appendix A-B for proof.
The basic idea of our pricing mechanism is to first fix the pricing rule and then focus on user selection by exploiting the submodularity property. As mentioned in Section IV-A, if a set function f is nonnegative submodular and the problem is max A⊆S f (A), there exist heuristic-based algorithms (e.g., Algorithm 1) that provide solutions with performance guarantee at low complexity. Next, we will present our pricing mechanisms for single-batch and multi-batch offering.
1) Single-Batch Offering: As mentioned in Section III, we consider the following pricing rule in this work: the platform chooses a desired probability of recruitment γ ∈ (0, 1] such that γ i = min(γ, ρ i ) for any i ∈ S and determines corresponding prices, i.e.,
Given p γ (·), user selection then becomes
where Pr γ (A y ) = i∈Ay γ i · i / ∈Ay (1 − γ i ) and u γ (A y ) = v(A y ) − p γ (A y ). By Lemma 2, EU γ (A) is submodular.
However, the USM formulation also requires the objective function to be nonnegative, but EU γ (A) can be negative. To bypass this issue, one straightforward way is to define
is a constant that represents the maximum expected price, and adding a constant preserves submodularity. It is easy to see that EU γ (A) is both submodular and nonnegative, and max A⊆S EU γ (A) is equivalent to max A⊆S EU γ (A).
Another issue is that it may be difficult to analytically evaluate EU γ (A) (or EU γ (A)), since it involves an exponentially growing number of terms due to the summation in Eq. (31). In practice, the Monte-Carlo (MC) method [37] can be used to obtain estimates ofÊ U γ (A) as well asÊ U γ (A) (by adding the constant p 0 toÊ U γ (A)). We show that USM(S,Ê U γ ) has the following performance. Theorem 1. If |Ê U γ (A)−EU γ (A)| ≤ for some small > 0 for any A ⊆ S, USM(S,Ê U γ ) (or equivalently USM(S,Ê U γ )) returns a solution A with the following performance,
where OP T is the optimal solution for max A⊆S EU γ (A) as well as max A⊆S EU γ (A), p 0 = i∈S γ i p γ ({i}) and n = |S|.
Proof. See Appendix A-C for proof.
Algorithm 3 describes the algorithm for single-batch offering. Since each γ leads to a different solution A γ , it is better for the platform to search through a list of l candidate γ values (e.g. {0.1, 0.2, ..., 1.0}) to find the best one that maximizeŝ EU γ (A γ ). As USM takes O(n) time, the overall complexity of Algorithm 3 is O(ln).
Algorithm 3:
Single_Batch_Offering input : S -set of users, f -Ê U γ (·) (or equivalentlŷ EU γ (·))), Γ = [γ 1 , ..., γ l ] -candidate γ values where γ 1 < γ 2 < ... < γ l , p γ (·) -pricing rule output: A -selected users, p -prices, γ * -best probability of recruitment
2) Multi-Batch Offering: In the case of expired or rejected offers in the previous batch, the platform may send out more batches until the next batch is no longer profitable.
Denote by EU γ (B|A y ) the marginal EU of additional offers B conditioned on the set of recruited users A y ,
is the marginal utility of B y given A y . We can see from Lemma 2 that EU γ (B|A y ) is again submodular in B. The algorithm for multi-batch offering is provided in Algorithm 4. Starting from the second batch, the marginal EU function is passed as an input to Single_Batch_Offering (Line 3). If the (estimated) marginal EU of B is higher than a preset threshold τ > 0 (e.g., 0.01), then it is profitable on average to send out the next batch of offers (Lines 5). The platform will then wait for the results and update A, p, y accordingly (Line 6). The offering process stops when (1) there are no more users to consider (Line 2), or (2) the next batch is no longer profitable on average (Line 4).
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct simulations to evaluate proposed pricing mechanisms based on EU maximization, and compare them against baseline mechanisms based on (best-case) utility maximization. We also study the impact of offer expiration on our pricing mechanisms. Fig. 2a is a sample topology of 60 users, whose locations are randomly generated from the spatial Poisson process. The AoI is a 6km-by-6km region, discretized into a total of 169 points with a resolution of 450 meters. We assume an exponential kernel function K(d) = 15.5 · exp(− d 0.7 ), as shown in Fig. 2b , which is adapted from the semivariogram fitted from real measurements [9] . Given the above settings, negative marginal MI values are not observed and α is set to 0.
A. Simulation Setup
The domain of C i is [c i , c i + ∆c], where ∆c > 0 and c i is randomly generated from U [0.1, 0.2], where U [·, ·] denotes the uniform distribution. We consider two types of distributions: uniform (UN) and truncated normal (TN) distributions. TN is the normal distribution N (c i , (∆c/3) 2 ) truncated to [c i , c i + ∆c]. Compared to UN, TN represents the situation where the majority of users have sensing costs closer to the energy costs c i , despite the presence of opportunity costs. Besides, the same set of noise variances independently drawn from U [0.5, 1] is used throughout our simulation. 
1) Baseline Mechanisms:
As mentioned in Section III, an alternative way to design a pricing mechanism is to maximize the best-case utility as in Eq. (1), assuming no expired or rejected offers. In this simulation, we consider single-batch and multi-batch offering based on utility maximization as baseline mechanisms. That is, instead of passingÊ U γ (·) into USM in each batch (Line 3 of Algorithm 3), we pass u γ (·) (a nonnegative submodular function) into USM, where u γ (A) = u γ (A) + p γ (S) and u γ (A) = v(A) − p γ (A). Compared to EU γ (·), the objective function u γ (·) does not require the MC method and is easy to evaluate.
For convenience, we refer to EU-maximization-based mechanisms by feedingÊ U γ (·) to USM as USM-EU, and baseline mechanisms by feeding u γ (·) to USM as USM-u.
B. USM-EU vs. USM-u in Single-Batch Offering
In this experiment, we compare the performance of USM-EU and USM-u in singe-batch offering.Ê U γ (·) is obtained by averaging over 50 iterations of MC simulations. We randomly select 30 or 60 users, and set κ in v(·) (Eq. (17)) to 4 or 8, and ∆c to 0.1 or 0.5. We assume no expired offers by setting ρ i = 1 for each user i, and will study its impact later in Section VI-C3. A total of 30 iterations are conducted, and a different seed is used for generating users and cost distributions in each iteration. In the i-th iteration, however, the same set of users and cost distributions are used across different γ and mechanisms for fair comparison. Results are provided in Fig. 3 . In Fig. 3a , we first observe that γ * achieving the maximum averaged EU is less than 1 for both USM-EU and USM-u under both UN and TN distributions. Intuitively, with a smaller γ, the platform can save money per user and send out more offers. Although each offer is less likely to be accepted, the platform achieves a greater EU on average. Second, at γ = γ * , USM-EU achieves a higher EU than USM-u, especially for UN. Besides, the fact that more money is saved per user under TN than UN with the same γ explains the observation that both USM-EU and USM-u achieve a larger EU under TN than UN.
Similar behaviors are observed in Fig. 3b and 3d . But in Fig. 3c when ∆c is changed from 0.5 to 0.1, the uncertainty in opportunity costs is reduced and energy costs become more dominant. In this case, the platform will not save much per user with a small γ and should choose a larger γ. Besides, we do not observe the advantage of USM-EU. Furthermore, as shown in Fig. 3a , USM-EU is slightly better than USM-u with γ between 0.3 and 0.6 under UN, but their performance is very close for γ ≤ 0.2 under UN and for all γ values under TN. This is mainly because in those cases, both mechanisms will send out offers to more or all users (30 max. in this setting) and thus achieve very close EU. When there are more users (Fig. 3b) , USM-EU is better than USM-u under both UN and TN for γ < 0.6. With smaller ∆c (Fig. 3c) , USM-EU is less advantageous. With smaller κ (Fig. 3d) , each user is less valuable and USM-u selects fewer users, since it assumes no expired or rejected offers. In contrast, USM-EU considers the average-case utility and is more aggressive in user selection, which explains its better performance than USM-u with the same small γ.
C. Batched Offering vs. Sequential Offering
In this simulation, we compare the following mechanisms: We randomly select n out of 60 users, and generate a set of noise variances and cost distributions, which are used in all iterations for each n. In the i-th iteration, a different set of sensing costs is independently generated from the cost distributions and used across different mechanisms for fair comparison. We set ∆c = 0.5, and varied n, κ or {ρ i } to study their impacts on the average utility achieved by the platform. All results are averaged over 50 iterations. Due to limited space, only results for UN distributions are reported, but similar observations exist for TN distributions.
1) Impact of n (number of users): We first set κ = 4 and ρ i = 1 for each user i (i.e., no expired offers). n is varied from 10 to 60, and results are provided in Fig. 4a . First, we observe that all mechanisms achieve a higher utility on average as n increases. Second, if only one batch/round is allowed, USM-EU achieves the highest utility, since it accounts for possible expiration and rejection and thus makes more offers in the first batch. The improvement of USM-EU (i.e., SB-EU) over USM-u (i.e., SB-u) varies from 8.5% with n = 10 to 40.5% with n = 60 (Fig. 4a) , which means the advantage of SB-EU (over SB-u) is more obvious with more users. SE performs the worst, since it only sends out one offer in the first round.
When more batches are allowed (Fig. 4b ), all mechanisms perform better, since it is always beneficial to send out more batches to make up for expired or rejected offers in the previous batch. Since USM-EU is very generous in making offers in the first batch, following batches become less profitable. If the maximum number of batches is unlimited, USM-u (i.e., MB-u) eventually achieves very close performance with USM-EU (i.e., MB-EU), but the price is a much larger cumulative delay. For instance, when n = 60, MB-EU and MB-u make 2.5 and 7.7 batches of offers on average, but the number is 24.9 for SE, which is the worst.
2) Impact of κ (currency in Eq. (17)): We then fix n = 30 and vary κ from 1 to 6. We set ρ i = 1 for each user i. As shown in Fig. 4c , the average utility obtained by each mechanism increases as κ increases, because the platform values per unit MI (log-scaled) more and is able to recruit more users. Besides, SB-EU is still better than SB-u for different κ, but its advantage is less obvious when κ gets larger. For instance, the improvement is 127.1% with κ = 1, but reduces to 13.4% with κ = 6. Moreover, multi-batch offering is better than single-batch offering for both USM-EU and USM-u, but the improvement is more significant for USM-u.
3) Impact of ρ (probability of unexpired offers): We set n = 30 and κ = 4. For simplicity, we assume ρ i = ρ for each user i and vary ρ from 0.2 to 1. Results are provided in Fig. 4d . First, we observe that all mechanisms are adversely affected when ρ decreases. Even though the platform knows ρ and adjusts the price as in Eq. (30) to achieve γ, i.e., increasing the acceptance probability to offset the high expiration probability, it implies higher prices for users and consequently reduced utility. As mentioned earlier in Section V-B, the best price for each user in SE does not depend on ρ, but the resulting marginal EU does. Nevertheless, SE observes the outcome of the previous offer and continues offering, which explains it (as well as multi-batch offering) is more robust against offer expiration than single-batch offering.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we designed a crowd-sensing system for spatial-statistics-based radio mapping and developed pricing mechanisms, i.e., sequential and batched offering, based on EU maximization. We conducted extensive simulations to evaluate proposed mechanisms. Our results show that if only one batch is allowed, the proposed mechanism based on EU maximization is significantly better than the utility-maximization-based baseline mechanism. If multiple batches are permitted (and the number of batches is unlimited), the proposed mechanism achieves close performance with the baseline mechanism, but requires much fewer batches and thus a much smaller delay. Sequential offering works better than the single-batch baseline mechanism, but has a much larger cumulative delay. Offer expiration adversely affected all mechanisms, but sequential and batched offering are relatively more robust.
There are several interesting and important future directions that could be explored. First, it would be very interesting to apply spatio-temporal statistics to model temporal correlations and capture temporal variations in radio environments. Second, it would be of practical importance to investigate the problem in an online setting, where users arrive in random order and one-time price offer has to be made upon each user's arrival. Such an online pricing mechanism would better handle high user mobility and minimize actual displacements between reported and sensing locations. Last but not the least, we would like to consider security and user privacy of our system.
